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Welfare Improving Coordination of Fiscal and
Monetary Policy
Andrew Hughes Hallett, Jan Libich, Petr Stehl´ ık†
Abstract Should independent monetary and ﬁscal policies coordinate their actions and/or tar-
gets? To examine this question the paper considers a simple reduced-form model in which mone-
tary and ﬁscal policies are formally independent, but still interdependent—through their mutual
spillovers. The analysis shows that the medium-run equilibrium levels of inﬂation, deﬁcit, and
output depend on the two policies’ (i) potency (elasticity of output with respect to the policy
instruments), (ii) ambition (the level of their output target), and (iii) conservatism (inﬂation vs.
output volatility aversion). What matters is however the relative degrees of these characteris-
tics across the two policies rather than the absolute degrees for each policy. This implies that
coordination of monetary and ﬁscal policy is superior to non-cooperative Nash behaviour. In
particular, we ﬁnd that ambition-coordination is more important than conservatism-coordination
in terms of avoiding medium-run imbalances due to a tug-of-war between the policies. For this
reason, and perhaps surprisingly, ambition-coordination can be welfare improving even if the
policymakers’ objectives are idiosyncratic, and their coordinated output targets differ from the
socially optimal value.
Keywords Coordination, interaction, monetary policy, ﬁscal policy, central bank, government,
inﬂation, deﬁcit
JEL classiﬁcation E61, E63   †
1. Introduction
Early work on the theory of economic policy stressed the importance of accounting
for the interactions between ﬁscal (F) and monetary (M) policy. Tinbergen (1954) and
Cooper (1969) showed us that there would be costs in missed targets, instability, and
protracted imbalances if policy interaction was ignored. Yet many models used today
either ignore the effect of the other policy, or focus on the direct interaction related to
the independence of the central bank and its incentives.1
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1 The direct interaction refers to the ability of the government (F policymaker) to directly affect M policy
outcomes through (i) the appointment of the central banker (Rogoff 1985), (ii) optimal contract with the
central banker (Walsh 1995), or (iii) overriding the central bank (Lohmann 1992).
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This paper follows in the footsteps of the seminal work of Sargent and Wallace
(1981) and Leeper (1991) by focusing on the indirect interaction. Speciﬁcally, we
examine how M and F policies affect each other through spillovers onto the princi-
ple target of the other policy.2 As a matter of experimental control, we will separate
the direct and indirect effects by assuming that the M and F policymakers are fully
independent in a constitutional and political sense.
Our aim is to consider the desirability (or otherwise) of M and F policy coor-
dination. There exists a number of papers in which a monetary-ﬁscal coordination
problem arises, for example Adam and Billi (2008), Branch et al. (2008), Eusepi and
Preston (2008), Chadha and Nolan (2007), Weymark (2007), Persson et al. (2006),
Benhabib and Eusepi (2005), Gali and Monacelli (2005), Eggertsson and Woodford
(2006), Dixit and Lambertini (2003, 2001), van Aarle et al. (2002), Sims (1994), Petit
(1989), or Alesina and Tabellini (1987). The fact that these papers use a wide range of
modelling approaches and frameworks suggests that an emergence of a coordination
problem between M and F policy is a robust ﬁnding worthy further investigation.
To offer several novel insights we use a reduced-form model similar to Nordhaus
(1994), in which this can be done analytically, and the intuition is easy to discern. In
doing so we follow Blanchard (2008) who calls for ‘the re-legalization of shortcuts
and of simple models.’ In the model both policymakers (i) have the standard quadratic
preferences over inﬂation and output, and (ii) can directly or indirectly affect both of
these variables. The difference between the policymakers is their output target; unlike
the central bank, the government attempts to achieve output beyond the natural level.
Because of that, imbalances can build up over time.
Our interest lies in examining the medium-run macroeconomic outcomes of the
policy interaction—in contrast to the research of the past decade that has focused on
short-run outcomes and the stabilization bias.3 We believe that the global ﬁnancial
crisis brings medium-run outcomes and imbalances back to the fore. Speciﬁcally, we
are interested in the horizon of 5–10 years over which imbalances and bubbles can
build up.
The model presented in Section 2 incorporates and shows the spillover effects of
three standard parameters for each policy. We deﬁne the policies’ potency to be the
elasticity of output with respect to the corresponding policy instrument. Next we deﬁne
policy ambition to express the level of the output target relative to the natural rate.
Finally, policy conservatism describes the degree of aversion to inﬂation volatility vis-
` a-vis output volatility.
Most of the papers’ novel results are due to the fact that macroeconomic outcomes
are affected by the relative degrees of these characteristics for M and F policy, not
their absolute values for each policy independently. Because of that, some conven-
tional ﬁndings may be qualiﬁed or reversed by the inﬂuence of the other policymaker’s
decisions, similarly to the intuition of Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Leeper (1991).
Before examining the case for policy coordination in Section 4 under endogenous
2 For an empirical assessment of such spillover effects in several European countries see Klaas and Jakob
(1995).
3 Nevertheless, the short-run stabilization consequences are examined in a longer working paper version of
this article.
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preference parameters, Section 3 reports selected auxiliary results of the model un-
der exogenous policy preferences. This is in order to build up the intuition of the M
and F policy interactions in our framework. The section ﬁnds, among other things, the
following: (i) the equilibrium M policy response to a F easing (deﬁcit) may be M tight-
ening under some circumstances and M easing under others; (ii) a more conservative
central bank may increase rather than decrease the average level of inﬂation (unlike in
Rogoff 1985); (iii) similarly, an election of a less ambitious government can lead to
a higher rather than lower deﬁcit; (iv) an inﬂation bias may occur even if the central
banker and/or the government aim at below-natural output, and conversely, a deﬂation
bias may occur even if they aim at an above-natural output level.
All of these results are due to the interactions between a responsible M policy and
ambitious F policy. The policymakers’ actions are not made in a vacuum; they take
into account the expected response of the other policy. Because of that, in an effort to
correct for the spillovers each policy may end up ‘chasing its own tail.’
Some of the results reveal observational equivalence—an outcome may obtain un-
der a range of (fundamentally different) parameter values. For instance, anti-inﬂation
and ﬁscally sustainable policies may be time consistent and credible even if the re-
spective policymaker aims at above-natural output. This implies that achieving a low
inﬂation target and balanced budget may not be a result of conservative and responsible
policymaking. Conversely, failing to achieve these outcomes may not be an indicator
of idiosyncratic objectives or incompetent actions as this can happen even if the re-
spective policymaker responsibly aims at the natural output level. In both cases it is
the actions of the other policy which are disciplining its outcomes in the former case,
or restraining them in the latter.
While our analysis ﬁnds macroeconomic outcomes of the policy interaction to be
highly contingent upon the speciﬁc (economic and policy) circumstances, such ‘am-
biguity’ does not carry over to the prescription for policymakers. Speciﬁcally, all our
ﬁndings suggest that policy coordination is likely to be desirable. We examine this
hypothesis explicitly by letting each policymaker choose his output target (ambition)
and its relative weight (conservatism). Intuitively, coordinating on the level of the out-
put target provides a ﬁxed point for the policies, and hence prevents from a feedback
loop in which each policy responds to the other in anticipation of its actions.4 Fur-
ther, we ﬁnd that coordination in terms of the policy ambition may be more important
than coordination in terms of conservatism in determining medium-run outcomes, and
preventing imbalances from accumulating.
These results are in line with Dixit and Lambertini (2001), who call a situation
in which the policies coordinate on the socially optimal output target ‘monetary-ﬁscal
symbiosis.’ Interestingly however, we ﬁnd that ambition-coordination may still be
welfare improving even if (and, in fact, especially when) the policymakers’ objectives
differ from the social optimum, and when their policy instruments differ in potency.
The fact that such coordination avoids the ‘tug-of-war’ between the policies may more
than offset the deviations from the ﬁrst-best outcomes.
4 Coordination is advantageous when policies are used according to comparative advantage (Hughes Hallett
1986).
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2. Model
2.1 Features
Our aim is to illustrate several new aspects of the M and F policy interaction, and
to consider what they reveal about the need to coordinate M and F policies. We are
interested in settings that have the following features as in Nordhaus (1994) and much
of the subsequent literature:
(i) Instrument independence: The instruments of M and F policy are independently
set by the central bank and the government respectively in a rational (optimizing)
fashion.
(ii) Overlapping objectives: The preferences of M and F policy overlap, i.e. the
policies have at least one objective in common.
(iii) Overlapping effects: The impacts of M and F policy overlap, i.e. the policies
can both affect at least one of the objectives that they have in common.
(iv) Medium-runimbalances: Ourfocusisonoutcomesthatareunaffectedbyshocks,
but that may still be subject to various macroeconomic imbalances.
Notethatfeatures(ii)and(iii)implysomeinterdependenceofthepolicies—despite
their independence in (i). The majority of policy interaction models in the literature
have features (i)–(iii). However, in order to concentrate on the bare essentials of policy
coordination, we will use the simplest reduced-form model that has these four features.
The advantages of such reduced-form analysis vis-` a-vis a fully-ﬂedged micro-founded
general equilibrium model, such as the one in our companion work Franta et al. (2009),
will become apparent below. In Section 5 we discuss robustness issues and argue
that the nature of our main ﬁndings would remain unchanged in richer micro-founded
models (in which they could not however be shown analytically).
Our interest in the medium-run macroeconomic outcomes will be reﬂected in the
model in three main respects. First, we will examine the values that are obtained on
average (over the business cycle), and are hence unaffected by (zero mean) shocks.
Second, and because of that, each policymaker will have perfect control over their in-
strument. Third, we will assume that the long-term budget constraint of the economy
may not be satisﬁed in the medium-run. This is our shortcut to allow for the exces-
sive behaviour of some real world governments, and hence better mimic the resulting
macroeconomic imbalances.5 The current ﬁnancial crisis highlights the importance
of allowing for such imbalances, and analyzing their consequences. See for example
Buiter (2009) who is critical of the fact that in most of existing work ‘intertemporal
budget constraints are always satisﬁed by assumption [making] default, bankruptcy
and insolvency impossible:::’
5 Many countries, including a number of industrial ones, have been running an excessive ﬁscal policy
(budget deﬁcits on average over the cycle) for decades. While such behaviour is obviously not sustainable
forever, it suggests that the long-term budget constraint may be non-binding for signiﬁcant periods of time.
There is a large literature initiated by Leeper (1991) that highlights such issues.
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2.2 Setup
It will be assumed that both M and F policymakers are rational and have complete in-
formation. These standard assumptions will enable us to focus on the policy interaction
separately from any reputational issues that might otherwise arise.6
The policymakers’ single period utility functions, and the social welfare function
(denoted by S) follow the convention in the literature and, as Woodford (2003) has
shown, can be derived from microfoundations:7
ui =  bi(x xi
T)2 p2; (1)
where i 2 fM;F;Sg is the set of players, p is inﬂation, and x denotes the output gap
(the difference between the actual and correctly measured potential level). bi > 0
denotes the degree of conservatism (lower bi values denoting greater conservatism, as
in Rogoff 1985). The inﬂation target of both policies coincides and is normalized to
zero, unlike the output gap target, xi
T 2 R. We will refer to the latter as the degree of
ambition, and speciﬁcally to players with xi
T = 0, xi
T > 0, and xi
T < 0 as responsible,
over-ambitious, and under-ambitious, respectively.
In order to be able to contrast the inﬂuences of both policies we do not formally
restrict the values of xM
T , xF
T and xS
T. Nevertheless, in our discussion of Section 3 under
exogenous ambition we will focus on the standard case in which the central bank is
responsible, the government is over-ambitious, and society may be either of these,
i.e. 0 < xT
F  xT
S  xT
M = 0.8 To limit the degree of heterogeneity, we will assume
that ambition is the only aspect in which the government’s utility function may differ
from the social welfare function, i.e. impose bS = bF. The main reason given in the
literature for allowing xF
T > xS
T has been the presence of various political economy
features such as na¨ ıve voters or lobby groups.
Due to the medium-run focus, we will consider p to be directly the instrument of
M policy. In terms of F policy, the government will be choosing the budget, denoted
G, where G = 0, G > 0, and G < 0 express a balanced budget, a deﬁcit, and a surplus,
respectively. In order to incorporate the above feature (iii) we need a supply side
relation in which output can be affected by both policies, that is
x(p;G;:): (2)
We follow Nordhaus (1994) in depicting a speciﬁc form of such relationship to illus-
trate the intuition. Speciﬁcally, assume:
x = m(p  pe)+r(G p); (3)
where pe denotes inﬂation expected by private agents in a rational (forward looking)
fashion. The parameters m and r are positive and denote the potency of M and F
6 For an explicit modelling of reputation in an alternative framework see Hughes Hallett and Libich (2007).
7 We drop the time subscripts throughout since our interest lies in medium-run outcomes. For the same
reason we can disregard the players’ discounting without loss of generality.
8 This is one of the features that distinguishes our framework from the Barro and Gordon (1983) model.
There exists no inherent time-inconsistency problem in M policy per se.
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policy respectively. The supply function posits that real output can be stimulated by an
inﬂation surprise and a budget deﬁcit in real terms. As for the latter, we can think of
inﬂation reducing the purchasing power of the government’s transfer to the public, and
thus lower the income effect it generates. Because of that, the stimulatory consequence
through consumption and investment will be smaller.
Thespeciﬁcationin(3)implicitlyassumesthatsomenon-Ricardianfeaturesexist—
one can think of myopic voters or agents facing borrowing constraints. There exists
abundant evidence of both of these features, see e.g. Healy and Malhotra (2009) on the
former and Campbell and Mankiw (1990) on the latter.
Hughes Hallett et al. (2009) show that (3) can be derived from a standard New
Keynesian model in which ﬁscal policy is incorporated in a conventional way. The
working paper version of this article also examines more general speciﬁcations of the
supply relationship, and shows that the main ﬁndings remain unchanged. Let us note
that the demand side of the model is left out as it does not affect the medium-run
outcomes. The same is true about the exact details of expectations formation or the
presence of shocks.
It is now apparent that the model has the four features listed in Section 2.1. First,
the policymakers choose their instruments independently, without any direct interfer-
ence from the other policymaker. Second, the policies share some objectives in (1),
namely preference for inﬂation control and output stabilization. Third, the speciﬁca-
tion of (1)–(3) implies that both policies can affect one of the shared objectives, namely
the output gap. Fourth, there are no shocks on average in the medium-run and the gov-
ernment faces no (binding) intertemporal budget constraint.
For a long-run analysis one would have to include an intertemporal budget con-
straint of the government. In our context, it would be assuming that G  0 has to hold
on average. Nevertheless, we will not impose such a restriction in order to allow for
the possibility that the government is running deﬁcits on average over the medium term
(say 5–10 years), and for imbalances to build up over time. Based on F outcomes in the
real world, in which many countries have run structural deﬁcits for signiﬁcant periods
of time (even in the expansionary part of the business cycle and despite deteriorating
demographic factors), we believe such speciﬁcation should not be ruled out a priori
and deserves an investigation.9
2.3 Solution











9 Obviously, this cannot be a description of the long-run since rational agents would refuse to hold govern-
ment debt.
10 The paper focuses on the discretionary outcomes for two reasons. First, our attention lies in policy coor-
dination which can be considered as a partial substitute for the (timeless perspective) commitment solution.
Second, our focus in on the medium-run outcomes, whereas a timeless perspective targeting rule predomi-
nantly affects the short-run stabilization outcomes.
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Solving jointly yields the following equilibrium medium-run outcomes (denoted by an
asterisk throughout)
p = bM(r  m)(xF
T  xM






T ); and x = xF
T: (5)
Note that M policy is neutral in the medium-run; no M variable affects x. Never-
theless, as a consequence of feature (iv) of Section 2.1, output may deviate from the
natural level in the medium term, i.e. x may be non-zero. This can be interpreted as
accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances over the medium term.11 Naturally, if a
long-run budget constraint is imposed this would no longer be possible.
The following section shows how each policy, and importantly their interaction,
may contribute to (and in turn be affected by) these imbalances. In doing so it treats
the policy parameters as given. Section 4 then endogenizes the degree of ambition and
conservatism of both policies in examining the case for policy coordination.
3. Auxiliary results: M and F policy interaction
This section presents selected results of the model with exogenous policy parameters
in order to better develop the intuition of the M and F policy interaction.12
Remark 1 (Interdependence). For almost all parameter values, the equilibrium setting
of each policy is a function of the other policy’s variables.
Inspectionof(5)revealsthat, forallr 6=m andxF
T 6=xM
T , thelevelofp isafunction
of xF
T and r, and the value of G is a function of bM, xM
T and m. This implies that the
other policy’s setting generally matters—even if the policies are formally independent.
Figure 1 shows how, under selected parameter values, p depends on r and G depends
on m. Figure 2 further shows the dependence of p on bM and xM
T , and G on bM and
xF
T.
The following proposition examines the way the central bank will respond to the
government’s actions in more detail.
Proposition 1 (Monetary responses). Not only the magnitude, but also the direction
of the central banker’s best response to a budgetary outcome depends on the relative
potency of the two policies. There exist circumstances under which the equilibrium
response to a ﬁscal easing (deﬁcit) is:
(i) M tightening (and this can be true even for an over-ambitious M);
(ii) M easing (and this can be true even for an under-ambitious or responsible M);
(iii) no change in the stance of M policy.
11 This is consistent with the evidence that the policymakers may have persistent misperceptions about the
level of potential output, see e.g. Orphanides (2001), and that, as a result, output can deviate from potential
for long periods of time, see e.g. Beck and Wieland (2008).
12 Many additional results of the model are reported in the working paper version of this article.
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Proof. Simple manipulation of the reaction functions in (4) reveals that p is (i)
decreasing in G iff r 2 (maxfm   1
rbM;0g;m); (ii) increasing in G iff r 2 (0;m  
1
rbM)[(m;¥); and (iii) independent of G iff r = m.
Figure 1. M and F policy reaction functions: Optimal inﬂation p (the left panel) and deﬁcit
G (the right panel) as functions of the setting of the other policy and their relative
potency m  r; under xM
T = 0, xF
T = bM = bF = m = 1.
Figure 1 demonstrates these results graphically. Its left panel shows that p is
non-monotonic in G, with the dashed line indicating the threshold m = r at which the
direction changes.13 It should be stressed that the difference in optimal M responses
is not due to business cycle ﬂuctuations—to control for these we have made the model
deterministic.
Instead, it is due to the feedback effect between M and F policy. Speciﬁcally, the
level of inﬂation affects the optimal size of the deﬁcit, which in turn affects the optimal
level of inﬂation. Since the respective magnitudes of these effects may differ, the
direction of the monetary responses (i.e. whether M counter-acts or accommodates)
may vary too. The intuition is similar to the seminal work of Leeper (1991) under
regime switches from active M and passive F policy to passive M and active F policy.
The following proposition relates to the effect of policy ambition on outcomes.
Proposition 2 (Observational equivalence). The inﬂation target and balanced budget
may be, on average over the medium-run: (i) deviated from even if the respective po-
licymaker is responsible, and (ii) achieved even if the respective policymaker is under
or over-ambitious.
Proof. Rearranging (5) yields
p

= 0 if r = m and/or xF
T = xM
T ;
6= 0 otherwise, and G
(









13 Since the real world potencies may vary over time, it is possible that both m > r and m < r occur at some
stage. We therefore plot both of these cases in our ﬁgures.
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It therefore follows that we may observe p 6= 0 and G 6= 0 even if xM
T = 0 and xF
T =
0 respectively—claim (i), but also p = 0 and G = 0 even if xM
T 6= 0 and xF
T 6= 0
respectively—claim (ii).
Figure 2. Equilibrium policy setting: inﬂation p (the left panel) and deﬁcit G (the right panel)
as functions of the output target values (xM
T and xF
T respectively) and M policy conser-
vatism bM; under xF
T = bF = m = 1, r = 0:5 in the left panel, and xM
T = 0:5, bF = 1,
m = 2, r = 1 in the right panel.
For an illustration see Figure 2. In terms of claim (i), the ﬁgure shows that all
values of p and G, except those indicated by the dashed lines, differ from zero. This
is in line with the intuition of the time-inconsistency result of Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), but with two important differences.
First, in addition to an inﬂation bias, a deﬂation bias can also occur, and this can
happen even if the central banker and/or the government are over-ambitious (see the
interval between the two dotted lines in the left panel). Second, the deviation from the
inﬂation target is due to the effect of F policy, not M policy.
In terms of claim (ii), Figure 2 and equation (3) show that the values of p and G
may be zero even if the respective policymaker is not responsible. We can think of this
as a ‘disciplining’ effect coming from the other policy. For example, the central banker
may indirectly (by altering the incentives faced by the F policymaker) discipline an
otherwise over-ambitious F policymaker and achieve a balanced budget.14
These results alert us to the fact that, in predicting macroeconomic outcomes, the
policy objectives and settings have to be viewed in light of the other policy’s setting.
Speciﬁcally, achieving the inﬂation target or balanced budget is not sufﬁcient for us
to conclude that the respective policymaker is responsible. Since fundamentally dif-
ferent combinations of parameter values of both policies provide incentives for certain
actions, under policy interaction it may be impossible to infer the type of the policy-
maker from the outcomes of the policy alone.
14 NotehoweverthatthepricetopayforthisF disciplineisadeﬂationaryM policy. Inaverydifferentsetting
of Libich et al. (2007) we allow the policymakers to explicitly commit to their actions (i.e. effectively equip
them with an additional instrument). We show that in such cases M policy may, under some circumstances,
discipline an over-ambitious F policy without compromising the low inﬂation target.
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The following proposition shows that policy conservatism and ambition may have a
non-monotone effect on the level of inﬂation and the budget when M and F interactions
are taken into account. This may reverse the expected outcomes of the delegation
process.
Proposition 3 (Appointments and elections).
(i) Appointment of a more conservative and/or less ambitious central banker may
increase, decrease, or have no effect on the level of inﬂation, and the size of the
budget deﬁcit.
(ii) Election of a less ambitious government has an equally ambiguous effect.
Proof. All the claims follow directly from (5). For example in terms of claim (i),
the value of p is: decreasing in bM under m > r ^xM
T < xF
T or m < r ^xM
T > xF
T;
increasing in bM under m > r ^xM
T > xF
T or m < r ^xM
T < xF
T, and independent of bM
under m = r _xM
T = xF
T.
In terms of claim (ii), rearranging equation (5) reveals that G is independent of xF
T
under m = m(r), where this threshold value is
m = r +
1
rbM > r:
Equation (5) further implies that if m > m(r) then G is decreasing in xF




The results can be seen in Figure 2. In terms of claim (i) let us focus on the effect
of a more conservative central banker—a smaller value of bM. The left panel shows
that for the less likely values xM
T > xF
T a lower bM reduces inﬂation, and for the more
likely values xM
T <xF
T it increases inﬂation, and for the xM
T =xF
T values it does not affect
inﬂation.
These results are in contrast to the Barro-Gordon-Rogoff literature whereby a more
conservative central banker always reduces the level of inﬂation (see Hughes Hallett et
al. 2009 for further comparative ﬁndings in this direction). In our setup a low inﬂation
policy may stimulate the economy better than a high inﬂation policy—by increasing
the real value of the deﬁcit and hence magnifying its income effect and expansionary
impactbetterthananyinﬂationsurprisecould. ThisissimilartotheintuitionofSargent
and Wallace’s (1981) unpleasant arithmetic result or the analysis of Leeper (1991).
The right panel of Figure 2 then shows that if xF
T = xM
T (indicated by the dotted
line), then the value of the deﬁcit is independent of the type of the central banker




T , a more conservative central banker leads to a
higher and lower deﬁcit G respectively. In words, a more conservative central banker
may, depending on the relative potency and ambition in the two policies, accentuate
or eliminate the ambition of the F policymaker, and hence worsen or improve the
budgetary outcomes. Whichever case obtained depends on what type of F opponent
(in terms of ambition and potency) the central banker is facing, which determines how
strongly, and in which direction, the opponent is expected to react.
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In terms of claim (ii) of the proposition, the right panel of Figure 2 shows that
if bM = 1 (indicated the dotted line derived from (3)), then G is independent of xF
T.
However, under bM > 1 and bM < 1, a lower value of xF
T leads to a lower and higher
deﬁcit G respectively. This implies that caution should be exercised in concluding
that a less ambitious government will surely improve the country’s ﬁscal position. Ne-
vertheless, given that the former case obtains over a larger parameter space (including
some values of m >r, and all values of m r), it might be argued that a less ambitious
government leads to an improvement in the ﬁscal position more often than not.
4. Main results: optimal M and F policy coordination
The above results imply that the relative degrees of M and F policy parameters may
play a more important role in macroeconomic outcomes than their levels do individ-
ually. In particular, they show that policymakers may often be trying to offset the
behaviour of the other policymaker, with spillovers that may lead to undesirable out-
comes for both the policies and society. This is exactly the case for coordination made
by Tinbergen (1954) and Cooper (1969) years ago. Therefore, two speciﬁc questions
need to be addressed:
(i) How conservative and ambitious should M and F policy be: what is the socially
optimal institutional setting for these policies with respect to xM
T , xF
T, bM, bF?
(ii) Is this socially optimal scenario incentive compatible and superior to a Nash
game in which the respective policymakers choose their policy parameters in-
dependently, or is active policy coordination required? If so, is it coordination
of the output targets (ambition-coordination), coordination of the stabilization
weights (conservatism-coordination), or both, that can improve social welfare?
To examine these questions let us extend our game by endogenizing the four po-
licy preference parameters fxM
T ;xF
T;bM;bFg. At the very beginning of the game the
corresponding policymakers choose simultaneously the values of their xi
T and bi (the
timing is not crucial to the results obtained). All chosen fxM
T ;xF
T;bM;bFg can then be
observed by the opponent and private agents before the simultaneous moves of p, pe;
and G are made.15
Proposition 4 (Nash outcomes). In the endogenous game there exists multiple pure




They all yield the same, highest attainable utility to both policymakers, which is strictly
greater than that of any non-Nash outcome (pure or mixed). Therefore, ambition-
coordination ensuring (6) is desirable for both policymakers.
15 Let us note that utility comparisons may be problematic if their parameters are allowed to change. Never-
theless, in our case what matters is the relative magnitudes across policies, not the absolute levels for each
policy independently, and therefore such comparison is possible.
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Proof. It is shown in Appendix A1 that all Nash equilibria are such that (6) holds,
and p and G satisfy (5)—with any levels of bM and bF. In those Nash equilibria we
therefore have p = 0 and x = xF
T from (5), and hence ui = 0;8bi, m , r, i from (1),
which is the unique maximum of ui;8i.
From the fact that there exist a large (inﬁnite) number of such Nash equilibria it
follows that, in the absence of ambition-coordination, the selected values of xM
T and xF
T
will almost certainly not satisfy (6).16 Noting that any xM
T 6= xF
T is inefﬁcient yielding
ui < 0;8i completes the proof.
Let us note two issues implied by the analysis. First, M and F policy ambition are
strategic complements. Second, the fact that xM
T = xF
T is not essential, what makes
ambition-coordination desirable is the fact that xM
T is a function of xF
T; and xF
T is
a function of xM
T . These results are demonstrated graphically in the right panel of




Proposition 5 (Socially optimal ambition-coordination). There exists a unique so-





and it is incentive compatible. Ambition-coordination may however be welfare improv-
ing even if the policymakers coordinate on an output target xC
T other than the socially





Proof. See Appendix A2.
Figure 3. Equilibrium F utility and social welfare (assuming uS =uF) as a function of M policy
ambition xM
T , and the deﬁcit G or M policy conservatism bM; under xS
T = xF
T = bM =
r = 1, m = 1:5 in the left panel, and xS
T = xF
T = bF = m = 1, r = 0:5 in the right
panel.
16 Unlike in our setup, in the real world the policymakers may have some beliefs about the ‘likely’ xT choices
of the opponent, which may serve as ‘focal points’ and somewhat reduce the set of possible outcomes.
Nevertheless, even then the xM
T = xF
T outcome does not obtain with certainty in the absence of coordination.
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Figure 3 shows, assuming xS
T =xF
T for illustration, that social welfare is maximized
at the coordinated ambition level in (6)—the black dot in the left panel and the dashed





 implies lower social welfare.
Intuitively, coordination of M and F policy on the level of their output targets is
desirable for both players as well as the society because a speciﬁc combination of xM
T
and xF
T delivers the optimal inﬂation target, p = 0. Since M policy cannot affect the
equilibrium level of average output, this is the best medium-run M policy setting.
Remark 2. Conservatism-coordination does not affect medium-run outcomes.
The redundancy of this type of coordination in our framework is implied by the fact
that while bM has some importance, bF does not affect any macroeconomic variables
in the medium-run. Therefore, the combination of bM and bF plays no role either over
that horizon.
At face value, the analysis offers two options for the social planner. We exami-
ned one of ‘delegation-cum-coordination’ in which M policy had been delegated to an
independent central bank, and showed the need for policy coordination. An alterna-
tive solution is one of ‘no delegation’, in which the central bank would not be made
independent in the ﬁrst place.
In the latter case the government would set both M and F policy, and could achieve
both the optimal inﬂation level and its desired output target without having to coordi-
nate with another independent institution. The problem with this avenue is apparent: if
the government is not benevolent, and his ambition is driven by idiosyncratic factors,
then it would naturally select a suboptimal output target level, xF
T > xS
T. Proposition 5
showed that, even in the case in which such outcome is superior to the non-coordinated
Nash outcomes, the ﬁrst-best cannot be achieved.
In such case an independent central bank may act as a vehicle to discipline the
government, and achieve the coordinated output targets closer to the socially optimal
level. The fact that the majority of countries have opted for an independent central
bank suggests that pressure from the government is considered a real possibility.17
5. Robustness
We have used a simple reduced-form model for our analysis for two main reasons.
First, the intuition of the results can then be shown analytically, unlike in most recent
micro-founded general equilibrium models of policy interaction. Second, the existing
models typically focus on the stabilization outcomes and ﬂuctuations, and do not con-
sider the medium/long-run levels. As such, they do not allow for persistent imbalances
to occur.
Nevertheless, the use of a reduced-form model may raise robustness questions.
To address some potential issues the working paper version of this article considers
17 Nevertheless, the effects of central bank independence have not been unambiguously established in the
literature, see e.g. Forder (1998) for a debate. More research is therefore required to shed light on its various
aspects, especially with the important distinction of instrument vs. goal independence of Debelle and Fischer
(1994) in mind.
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extensions in two main directions. First, various modiﬁcations to the supply relation-
ship in (3) are investigated, including one in which F policy enters in nominal terms
rather than in real terms. Second, stochastic disturbances are incorporated under two
scenarios—information symmetry and asymmetry.18 It is shown that these extensions
do not affect our medium-run conclusions.
Are our insights likely to obtain in richer, micro-founded general equilibrium set-
tings? The ﬁnding of Remark 1 regarding the interdependence of M and F policy is
uncontroversial, and largely independent of the model used. Such interdependence has
been the focus of many recent papers cited above using state-of-the-art general equi-
librium models. Intuitively, policy interdependence is ensured by features (ii) and (iii)
of Section 2.1—the policies share some objectives and both impact these objectives.
Thus micro-founded general equilibrium models are not necessary to obtain those re-
sults, although they evidently will produce analogously interdependent outcomes too.
The problem is that such models cannot be solved analytically, and the intuition is
therefore difﬁcult to see.
Similarly, our main ﬁnding regarding the importance of ambition-coordination (re-
ported in Propositions 4 and 5) is robust. This follows from two facts. First, the poli-
cies are inter-related, i.e. their optimal actions will be affected by some combination
of the two policies’ parameters. Second, the policy parameters that affect the medium-
run outcomes are, in most settings including the popular New Keynesian framework,
a function of the target levels (i.e. xT’s), whereas the stabilization dynamics is more
often a function of the relative weights (i.e. b’s).
In contrast, the results reported in Propositions 1–3 and Remark 2 are arguably less
robust. This is because they depend, at least to some extent, on the way M and F poli-
cies are assumed to affect the real economy. Our analysis is not sufﬁcient to conclude
that they are the (most) likely outcomes, and more research is required to shed light
on their real world relevance. For example, Rogoff (1985) examined the importance
of policy conservatism for short-run stabilization outcomes. His work therefore im-
plies that the variance of inﬂation and output in equilibrium will depend on both bM
and bF; in which case conservatism-coordination may play some role in the short-run.
Therefore, caution should be exercised in interpreting those latter results.
Despite these caveats, we believe that the current ﬁnancial crisis highlights the
importance of ‘thinking outside the box’ and provides a justiﬁcation for our approach.
6. Summary and conclusions
The interactions between ﬁscal and monetary policies are both important and com-
plex, even if we abstract from differences in the policies’ timing or reputations. One
of the reasons behind the complexity is that macroeconomic outcomes depend on
the spillovers from each policy onto the targets to which they are not principally as-
signed.19 And this is why, even if the policies are politically and constitutionally in-
18 Intheformercaseboththepolicymakerandexpectationsetterscanobservetheshockinrealtime, whereas
in the latter only the policymakers can.
19 The received position is that the Central Bank should control inﬂation and be independent of outside
forces (political pressures in particular), and that national ﬁscal policies should be left free to account for
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dependent, they are interdependent—their optimal setting is a function of the other
policy’s setting. Speciﬁcally, we show that the optimal monetary response to a ﬁs-
cal expansion (in any phase of the business cycle) can be to tighten monetary policy,
loosen it, or do nothing at all, depending on the relative potencies and ambition of the
policies.
Such interdependence implies a role for policy coordination. The paper examines
it in detail and ﬁnds that coordination in terms of policy ambition (targets) may be
more important for medium-run outcomes than coordination in terms of conservatism
(priorities). If the policymakers are benevolent and coordinate on the socially optimal
output target then the ﬁrst-best outcome can be achieved, which is unlikely without
coordination. But interestingly, we show that even if the policymakers’ objectives are
idiosyncratic, and they coordinate on an output target that differs from the socially
optimal one, such coordination can still improve social welfare relative to an uncoor-
dinated Nash outcome. This is because coordination prevents from the two policies
perpetually trying to offset each others’ actions, ie engaging in a tug-of-war.
The fact that there exist multiple policy settings that maximize the policymakers’
utility, all equally desirable by both policymakers, implies a different kind of coordina-
tion to the one examined in the existing literature. We argue that optimal coordination
may be more a matter of information exchanges between the policymakers (about the
natural rate of output that should be targeted, xT) than direct, competitive and discre-
tionary negotiations over the details of each policy choice (the levels of pt and Gt).
Nevertheless, more research is needed to deepen our understanding of the interactions
between monetary and ﬁscal policies, and to formulate speciﬁc recommendations re-
garding a potential policy coordination.
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Appendix
A1. Proof of Proposition 4
Solving by backwards induction, the Nash equilibrium values of inﬂation and output
are those derived in Section 2 under exogenous ambition and conservatism parameters.
They were reported in (5).
Moving backwards, substitute these into the players’ utility functions and differen-























Setting equal to zero and rearranging implies that the non-coordinated Nash equilibria
obtain for any xM
T = xF
T 2 R. For the rest of the proof see the main text.
A2. Proof of Proposition 5
Analogously to the proof of Proposition 4, solving backwards substitute the equilib-
rium values from (5) into the social welfare function and differentiate with respect to
xM
T and xF



























T. As this is one of the pure strategy Nash equilibria
reported in Proposition 4 that delivers the highest attainable utility to both players, it is
incentive compatible.





T, such ambition-coordination may still improve social wel-
fare. Whether or not it is the case depends on the coordinated level xC
T relative to the
uncoordinated xM
T and xF
T levels and the social optimum xS
T. Formally, for ambition-
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This implies that for any uncoordinated xM
T 6= xF








This threshold is a function of the uncoordinated xF
T and xM
T levels, the socially optimal
level xS
T; as well as the policy potencies and conservatism.
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